RMT General Secretary Bob Crow, wrote to the ORR following an incident in 2011 which resulted in the sacking, and subsequent reinstatement of James, due to the strong union response.The RMT complaint regarded firstly James’ alleged responsibility for the SPAD; and secondly, that James had been compelled to drive when unfit to do so. The letter below is the response.

You can read more about the case here.

The Letter

Dear Mr Crow

JAMES MASANGO

You wrote to me in 0ctober 2011 raising the case of James Masango and your concerns re Victoria Line rolling stock and that London Underground managers were pressuring drivers to work while medically unfit.
Firstly let me apologies for the protracted period it has taken to reply. I have sought to keep Paul Clyndes regularly informed however it initially took some time to gain James Masango’s authority to access his medical records (should it be needed) and the preparation and delivery of the 2012 Olympics made arranging meeting with relevant individuals difficult. Nonetheless in early March this year I met Paul Clyndes and explained the outcome of my enquiries.
These are as follows:

a) The Victoria Line signalling system and trains have all been replaced and the time lag between James Masango’s incident and your complaint means that none of the original signalling components remain in situ to subject to analysis. Consequently I could gather no evidence regarding deficiencies or otherwise concerning the equipment associate with James Masango’s original SPAD.

b) I could find no evidence of fundamental deficiencies in London Underground’s health and safety management system or Occupational Health arrangements; although there is undoubtedly room for more structured arrangement between managers and their staff for ensuring clear understanding of an individual’s fitness or otherwise to operate trains.
While there is no evidence to proceed formally against LU, the case of James Masango’s alleged SPAD does not appear to have been handled in the systematic manner I would have expected from LU, by those associated with it. Indeed James’ case and it’s handling has highlighted issues which I have raised with LU with a view to reducing the likelihood of a situation such as James experienced occurring again.
These are as follows:

1. The heart of Mr Masango’s situation arose from an alleged SPAD at Seven Sisters station on the Victoria line operating under the historic Automatic train operation (ATO) system. I have little doubt that something out of the ordinary and possibly not within James Masango’s control happened to the signalling system but it has been impossible to determine what this might be so long after the incident and with the historic system having been removed.

I can well understand RMT’s desire to support its member to the fullest and I appreciate that flagging a technical discrepancy to the regulator was perhaps not the first consideration. Nonetheless could I make a plea that in future where there are such potential technical issues, that they are raised with ORR early on. Such an action in James’ case might have provided an opportunity for a more detailed technical investigation into the specific equipment and circumstances.

That being said the essential element of the incident is that James Masango did not believe at the time that he had a SPAD and the whole subsequent procedure (from his point of view) never really made it clear to him he had a SPAD until it appeared in the notices. My discussion with James’ manager probably homed in on a key point; namely that SPADs on the Victoria line were not a common occurrence as it was an ATO line and therefore the procedure of communicating to James Masango that it was believed he had a SPAD was not done with the formality it perhaps should have been.

I have therefore recommended to LU that it reviews its procedure for designating a SPAD and in particular it considers:-
a) the mechanism by which a train operator is clearly informed that they may have had a SPAD and
b) How this is confirmed to the train operator no later than the end of his / her shift.
In short no train operator should sign off from a shift in which they may have had a SPAD without being formally told of it by LU.
Automatic train operation is being progressively rolled out across LU and SPADs will therefore become rarer occurrences on more lines. With SPADs subsequently becoming rarer events both LU and its train operators must be clear about the occurrence (or possible occurrence) of a SPAD.

2. Part of RMT’s complaint regarding James Masango was that he was required to operate trains while under a medical instruction that he was not fit to do so. I have not been able to fully get to the bottom of how James Masango was left in a position where he did not hold a personal copy of his medical document saying he was unfit to operate trains and why he was not provided with a copy of a medical document saying he was fit to operate trains. Again had there been more systematic handling by LU of James’ alleged SPAD and other medical matters I think the subsequent train driving issues would have been less likely to arise. However I have no evidence that such occurrences are widespread in LU.

Nonetheless I have recommended that LU review its procedure for designating train operator’s unfit / fit to operate trains. In particular I have indicated that once a train operator is personally in possession of a medical document designating him / her medically unfit to operate trains this document should remain current until such time as they are in possession of a medical document designating them fit to operate trains. Such documents should be in the personal possession of the individual affected and they should be able to produce them if requested to do so. It would of course be open to LU managers to take copies but the originals should remain with the TO.

I have asked for LU to confirm to me that it will initiate the reviews proposed above.

While none of the above can turn the clock back in respect of James Masango’s case it will hopefully ensure that such circumstances are unlikely to recur.

Yours sincerely

Keith Atkinson
HM Principal Inspector of Railways